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CRIME, THE COURTS, AND THE POLICE
(Comments upon The Supreme Court And The Police: A Police Viewpoint
by Vincent L. Broderick)
0. W. WILSON*
The factors that go to make up the current na-
tion-wide crime problem can be divided into four
broad areas:
First comes discipline. By discipline I mean in-
sistence upon conformance with rules: home rules,
school rules, and legal rules. Our society is an un-
disciplined one. This is evidenced by the crimi-
nality of our people. We are virtually overwhelmed
by crime. The fact that we are becoming a more
and more undisciplined society is apparent from
our ever increasing crime rate. It used to increase
five per cent annually; then it jumped to ten per
cent. In 1964 it was thirteen per cent above the
1963 rate and in 1965 it rose an additional five per
cent. In the past decade crime has increased five
times more rapidly than our population.
Why are we an undisciplined people? Because
we have rejected our forefathers' philosophy of in-
dividual responsibility and have adopted a false
philosophy of excuse. We go to almost any length
to excuse the miscreant from being held responsible
for his misbehavior.
Second, as a cause for our mounting crime prob-
lem, is the mobility of our people. One out of every
five of us moves his home each year. Those in
rural and in the smaller urban communities mi-
grate to larger urban areas and many of the mi-
grants are socially, economically, educationally,
culturally, morally, and spiritually under-privi-
leged. They migrate to improve their lot but many
times find themselves unemployable because of the
disadvantages to which they have been subjected.
President Johnson's economic opportunity
program, implemented in Chicago by our Urban
Opportunity Program and by similar programs in
other cities, will undoubtedly reduce the differ-
entials which are presently inducing criminal
behavior. But it will take time for the effects of
these measures to be reflected in a reduced crime
rate-perhaps five, ten or even more years.
The third factor is our burgeoning youth popu-
lation. You are all aware of the problems of provid-
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ing physical facilities and the instructors to man
them in the primary and secondary levels of our
educational system and even in our institutions of
higher learning.
The fact that in 1964 sixty-seven per cent of our
serious crimes were committed by persons under
twenty-five years of age points up the impact of
our expanding youth population on our crime
rate.
The fourth broad area of the causes contributing
to the current crime problem can be found in our
system of administration of criminal justice. This,
I think, is what we are now to discuss.
Following are excerpts from an editorial on
"The Rights of the Guilty" which appeared in the
April 26, 1965, issue of the Wall Street Journal:
Debate on crime is starting to move beyond
the usual exchange of epithets between "bleed-
ing hearts" on one side and "vigilantes" on
the other. Perhaps we will even get some il-
luminating discussion of a serious paradox
in criminal law: that just as crime rates are
soaring, courts are stepping up enforcement
of strict procedural rles which make it more
difficult to convict criminals. * * *
Indeed, Walter Lippmann, seldom counted
among the vigilantes put the situation nicely,
"The fact of the matter is, I think, that the
balance of power within our society has turned
dangerously against the peace forces-against
governors and mayors and legislatures, against
the police and the courts." * * *
Certainly it is only fair to apply the same jus-
tice to all (the indigent and the wealthy)
both in theory and in practice. The confusion
arises when sympathy for the unfortunate
merges into favoritism for the criminal. The
line can get very fine. * * *
A judicial system exists not only to exonerate
the unjustly accused, but to convict the guilty.
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The latter, no less than the former, is an im-
portant means of protecting the innocent
members of society.
Too many commentators, lawyers and judges
seem to lose sight of that simple truth. They
advocate or propound rules-some of which,
for instance, come close in practice to barring
all police interrogations of suspects-which
provide negligible safeguards for the innocent,
which seem rather to protect the guilty for
their own sake.
We recently noticed a striking, if perhaps un-
conscious, expression of that attitude in one
lawyer's comments on criminal trial publicity.
Press coverage should be suppressed, he
argued, to keep the innocent from being con-
victed and to "protect the rights of the guilty
persons to a fair trial." If a fair trial is one
which achieves justice, of course, it is the last
thing a guilty person wants. Like many law-
yers who would curb the press, this one seems
to argue not only that the innocent need
safeguards, but that the guilty ought to have
a sporting chance to exploit legal technicali-
ties.
Similar attitudes appear in the courtroom. In
one case a policeman saw two men in front
of a Western Union office drag a heavy object
into a car and speed away. He stopped them
and found a Western Union safe and some
burglar tools. Yet the judge suppressed the
evidence because the policeman acted without
certain knowledge that a crime had been
committed. Obviously, .limiting the police
power to investigate suspicious circumstances
is likely to help criminals; it is not obvious
how it protects the innocent, who have little
to fear from police inquiries. * * *
The abusive decisions, moreover, are largely
distillations of the prevailing confusion about
"rights of the guilty," which supports tech-
nicalities of little practical value in protecting
the innocent. The concern with helping un-
fortunate defendants and sheltering minority
groups can easily obscure the very practical
need to convict criminals. The double standard
has meant that the more fortunate could some-
times get away with crimes when others could
not. We are well on our way toward eliminat-
ing it by insuring that the less fortunate can
escape as well.
To avoid such a sophistic and downright
dangerous "solution," the attack on the
double standard should be coupled with a
searching review of criminal law, designed
to insure that a "fair trial" is not merely an
absorbing game played by increasingly
rarefied rules but fundamentally what it is
intended to be, a search for the truth.
I have quoted at length from this article so that
the words, which I doubt that I could have put so
well, would be those of an "outsider", and not a
person engaged directly in police administration.
When we, as police officers, decry court decisions
which hamper good police work, many people look
upon this as the lament of a policeman who is a
little bitter because his job has been made a little
more difficult. But the police officers in the nation
are genuinely concerned about the current trend
of the overemphasis upon the protection of the
rights of the criminal at the expense of the rights
of society.
THE SU'PREME COURT AND THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE
It has long been my opinion that the exclusion-
ary rule and all of its brethren are wrong simply
because they are based upon an unproven and
invalid premise-the postulate that justice will
ultimately be obtained by arbitrarily excluding
the truth on the peculiar theory that by doing so
the civil rights of all future defendants will be
secured. If one can swallow that assumption it is
easy to reason that the Mapp case,1 wherein evi-
dence was excluded because an unreasonable
search and seizure was conducted by the police,
and the Escobedo case,2 wherein a confession was
excluded because the defendant was denied his
right to counsel, were decided correctly. The facts
remain, however, that in the Mapp case there was
no question that Dollree Mapp was guilty of pos-
sessing "lewd and lascivious books, pictures and
photographs". That fact was not open to question
in the Supreme Court of the United States. She
was guilty and she went free. Certainly no justice
was administered by that decision. In explanation
of this apparent paradox the Court said:
There are those who say, as did Justice
Cardozo, ... that under our constitutional
exclusionary doctrine "the criminal is to go
free because the constable has blundered."
'Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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... In some cases this will undoubtedly be
the result. . . The criminal goes free if he
must, but it is the law that sets him free.3
Likewise, in the Escobedo case there was no ques-
tion as to the voluntariness or the trustworthiness
of Danny Escobedo's confession. These used to be
the tests that were applied by a court in deter-
mining the admissibility of confessions. 4 Under
these tests it was easy to see the rationale for
excluding a confession from evidence. If a con-
fession was not voluntarily given, that is, if it was
extracted by some type of coercion, there was rea-
son to believe that it might not be the truth and
justice might not be served by its admission in
evidence. The trustworthiness test was merely a
branch of that same idea. If there was any other
reason to believe that the confession was not the
truth, it was excluded. But in the case of Escobedo
the Court did not say that his confession might not
have been the truth or that justice might not have
been served in that case by admitting it. Instead,
it spoke of future cases and what the police must
and must not do.
While I am on the subject of whether or not
justice was served in the Escobedo case, I might
add that the "right" which the Court found Es-
cobedo to have been denied was not actually
denied. Escobedo had been arrested on January 20,
1960, and his attorney had secured his release on a
writ of habeas corpus that afternoon. It was not
until January 30, 1960, that he was again arrested
and, after about four hours, gave his statement.
What advice would the attorney have given him
in that four hour period that he could not have
given him in the previous ten days? Is the sixth
amendment right to counsel a right to have an
attorney to hold the accused's hand, or better yet
his mouth? Worse yet, it was brought out at the
trial that Escobedo's attorney had in fact advised
him, between January 20 and January 30, to re-
main silent and he had further taken a fleeting
glance at a wave of his attorney's hand while
they were both in the police station to mean that
the advice still prevailed.5 The fact is, that Esco-
bedo, evidently believing himself smarter than his
attorney, the police, and his accomplices, sought
to exculpate himself by making a statement which
he thought placed all of the guilt upon one of his
accomplices. Escobedo did not "crack" under the
3 367 U.S. at 659.4 See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
5 378 U.S. at 480.
"strain" of "constant grilling"; he simply out-
smarted himself.
Both Mapp and Escobedo were clearly wrong,
in my opinion, because both defendants went free
for reasons other than their innocence. We are told
that they are right because those who say so long
ago swallowed the premise upon which they are
based and they have lived with it through so many
decisions and through so many elaborations upon
it that they no longer have the ability to question
it. This, however, does not make it right. There
would have been very few who would have called
the Escobedo decision right in 1949.
THE EFFCrs or SuPRExE CoURT DEcIsIoNs
ON THE POLICE
We are told that local police should have no
problems complying with whatever restrictions the
Escobedo case finally produces6 because the T.B.I.
and other federal police agencies have long oper-
ated under similar restrictions imposed by the
McNabb-Mallory rule. As Commissioner Broder-
ick has pointed out, with the exception of the police
in the District of Columbia, the problems confront-
ing federal law enforcement agencies are of a very
different nature from those of local police agencies.
The necessity for in-custody investigation is
peculiar to local police agencies. It is not an equally
compelling need to the P.B.i. and other federal
law enforcement agencies. The local police must
patrol our streets and protect our lives and prop-
erty. They are the first line of defense, so to speak,
and it is they who are confronted on the street
with the immediate hard choices as to whether to
question or not to question, whether to detain or
not to detain, whether to arrest or not to arrest.
The investigations by the r.B.L, the Secret Service,
and other federal law enforcement agencies, by
their very nature, are more deliberate in character.
The identity and whereabouts of the subjects of
their investigations are usually known well in ad-
vance. It is a matter of gathering evidence. Ar-
rests can be delayed until all the facts are known.
This is not so with the local police who usually must
conduct their investigations on the spur of the
6 See the following decisions of the Supreme Court
that were decided subsequent to the Northwestern
University Conference: Miranda v. Arizona, Vignera v.
New York, Westover v. U.S., and California v. Stewart,
all of which are reported in 86 Sup. Ct. 1602 (1966).
7 See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943);
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
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moment and often when the accused is already in
custody. There is a vast difference in operations
such as these.
There are those who seem to advocate that the
police can perform their function without ques-
tioning suspects at all; that the solution of crimes
is merely a matter of proper skill and training to
find physical evidence at the scene of the crime.
These same individuals argue that this is the prac-
tice routinely followed by the F.B.I., and they ask
rhetorically why the police cannot be equally
skilled.
I submit that there is no substitute for ques-
tioning. Even in the relatively few cases where in-
criminating evidence is found at the scene of the
crime the evidence rarely speaks for itself. The
testimony of someone, or an admission by the ac-
cused, is usually needed to tie the evidence to the
accused and to make the physical evidence relevant
as proof.
I cannot express this thought better than was
done in the opinion in the case of Trilling v. United
Slates.8
At least one of the prime functions, if not the
prime function, of the police is to investigate
reports of crime or the actual commission of
crime. The usual, most useful, most efficient,
and most effective method of investigation is
by questioning people. It is all very well to say
the police should investigate by microscopic
examination of stains and dust. Sometimes
they can. But of all human facilities for
ascertaining facts, asking questions is the
usual one and always has been. The courts use
that method.
We are also told that the British policeman is
much more restricted than the policeman in the
United States when it comes to obtaining a con-
fession and that nearly any statement to the ac-
cused on the part of an English policeman is con-
sidered an improper threat or promise. We are
further advised that the English system works
very well in spite of such a restriction.
Jon R. Waltz, a professor of law atNorthwestern
University, has done a fine job of pointing out the
fallacy in such reasoning. In a recent review of
The Defendant's Rights Under English Law by
David Fellman,9 Professor Waltz wrote:
Feliman's Analysis demonstrates that in some
8 260 F. 2d 677, 700 (D.C.Cir. 1958).
9 Chicago Tribune, April 17, 1966 (Books Today, p.
16).
respects English solicitude for persons accused
of crime has been oversold in the United
States. Witness these comparisons:
England: English courts consider it "unad-
visable to grant bail to a person who has a long
criminal record unless there is a very real
doubt as to his guilt."
United States: The accused has a right to
pre-trial release on bail in all but the most
serious cases.
England: "Generally speaking, bail will not
be granted to a prisoner pending his appeal."
United States: Convicts are frequently freed
on bail pending the outcome of an appeal.
England: "English courts will not accept
professional bailsmen."
United States: Rightly or wrongly, we have
accepted the professional bail bondsman
since frontier days.
England: "...evidence secured unlawfully
is fully admissible."
United States: The product of an unreason-
able search and seizure is excluded from evi-
dence at the accused's trial.
England: In the discretion of the trial judge,
a confession shown to have been voluntarily
given may be received in evidence against
the accused even though obtained in violation
of the rules governing police questioning.
United States: The trend of American deci-
sions is toward exclusion of such statements.
England: "When a police officer is trying to
discover whether, or by whom, an offense
has been committed he is entitled to ques-
tion any person, whether suspected or not,
from whom he thinks that useful information
may be obtained."
United States: When Superintendent 0. W.
Wilson of the Chicago Police Department re-
cently announced that his men would conduct
themselves in a similar manner he was greeted
by a storm of outraged protest.
England: "... the English judge is free to
comment on the failure of the accused to
testify."
United States: Any such comment is con-
sidered a violation of the accused's constitu-
tional right to due process of law.
Clearly it is the whole system of administration
of criminal justice which we must consider; one
rule does not make a system. Two comparable sys-
tems may be made up of entirely different rules and
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any given rule or system can only be judged within
its own frame of operation.
Perhaps Mr. Broderick is correct when he says
it is a mistake to read into the Court's concern for
the rights of individuals a complete lack of concern
for the due administration of justice. In the area
of disclosure of informants, the Court actually
backed away to some degree from what seemed
to be a very bad trend established in the Roviaro'
0
case. At least the language of the Rugendorf"
opinion seems to indicate a softening of the Court's
earlier position. Also, in the area of wire-tapping,
the Court has steadfastly refused to hold that a
wire-tap, where there has been no physical trespass
upon the constitutionally protected area, raises
the question of the constitutionality of the pro-
cedure. The Court long ago held in the OlmsteadA
case that a wire-tap under these circumstances
was not a search or seizure, and seems to have
adhered to that position by its denial of certiorari
in the recent Dinanii case from New York. My
friends who are lawyers tell me that a denial of
certiorari should be given very little weight and
perhaps it means only that the Court is not yet
ready to make a decision on a particular point.
However, let me say that when I have found solace
in a rule of the Court in recent times it has been
more often than not a mere refusal to hear the case.
I do want to compliment the Court on one recent
decision. That is the case of United States v. Ven-
tresca.'4 I want to note here, however, that the
local judges and prosecutors have somehow failed
to make anything of the case. I am advised that
it is seldom cited, while the case that came before
it, and which it modified, Aguilar v. Texas, 5 has
been relied upon heavily by defense counsel.
Ventresca was convicted in the United States
District Court for Massachusetts for possessing
and operating an illegal distillery. The conviction
was reversed by the Court of Appeals on the ground
that the affidavit upon which the search warrant
was based was insufficient to establish probable
cause. The affidavit in question was couched in
terms such as "an observation was made" and
"Investigators smelled an odor of fermenting
mash".j6 The Court of Appeals held the warrant
10 Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
n Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964).
12 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
13 New York v. Dinan, 11 N.Y. 2d 350, 183 N.E. 2d
689, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 877 (1962).
11380 U.S. 102 (1965).
Is 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
6 The complete affidavit appears as an appendix to
the opinion. See 380 U.S. at 112-116.
to be insufficient because it read the affidavit as
not specifically stating upon whose personal knowl-
edge the affidavit was based. The United States
Supreme Court reversed this holding, saying (after
citing cases including Aguilar):
These decisions reflect the recognition that the
Fourth Amendment's commands, like all
constitutional requirements, are practical
and not abstract. If the teachings of the
Court's cases are to be followed and the con-
stitutional policy served, affidavits for search
warrants, such as the one involved here, must
be tested and interpreted by magistrates
and courts in a common-sense and realistic
fashion. They are normally drafted by non-
lawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal
investigation. Technical requirements of
elaborate specificity once exacted under com-
mon law pleadings have no proper place in
this area. A grudging or negative attitude by
reviewing courts toward warrants will tend
to discourage police officers from submitting
their evidence to a judicial officer before act-
ing.
This is not to say that probable cause can be
made by affidavits which are purely con-
dusory, stating only the affiant's or an in-
former's belief that probable cause exists
without detailing any of the "underlying cir-
cumstances" upon which that belief is
based.... Recital of some of the underlying
circumstances in the affidavit is essential if
the magistrate is to perform his detached
function and not serve merely as a rubber
stamp for the police. However, where these
circumstances are detailed, where reason for
crediting the source of the information is
given, and when a magistrate has found prob-
able cause, the courts should not invalidate
the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a
hypertechnical, rather than a common-sense
manner. Although in a particular case it may
not be easy to determine when an affidavit
demonstrates the existence of probable cause,
the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases
in this area should be largely determined by
the preference to be accorded to warrants 7
A departure from the Court's usual tack is ap-
parent here. In Escobedo, Mapp, Massiah,8 and
the other cases in the same mold, the Court, in
effect, punished the police for activity which did
17 380 U.S. at 108-109.
28 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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not meet with the Court's approval. In Ventresca
the Court took an opposite route and rewarded
the police for activity which did meet with its
approval. The reasoning was: police are to be en-
couraged to obtain warrants rather than judge the
existence of probable cause themselves; in all cases
it is difficult to determine whether probable cause
existed; in order to encourage the police to obtain
warrants we will resolve doubtful cases, where
warrants were used, in favor of the police.
The idea of rewarding the police for laudable
activity rather than punishing for "illegal" ac-
tivity is intriguing. I would guess that most people
would agree that the reward system is far more
effective. But, this is the only case of this type that
has come to my attention and it has not been fol-
lowed to any great extent.
TnE LACK OF GUIDELINUS
The fact that the Supreme Court hands down
what Mr. Broderick calls "open ended" decisions
means not only that we in law enforcement must
guess what the Supreme Court will do next, but
that we also must guess what our local courts will
do next.
One commentator has divided the state cases
which apply the Escobedo rule into no less than
six different groups. 19 Each group takes a different
view as to what the Court meant in the Escobedo
opinion. If the judges cannot agree on the rules,
how can we expect police officers to operate within
them?
One need not go the state courts to find dis-
agreement on the rules. The Supreme Court of the
United States has long shown a tendency to issue
"five-to-four" decisions. But recently it has been
issuing more and more multiple opinion decisions
in which no majority of the Court is able to agree
upon any one opinion. The three recent decisions
on the law of obscenity are outstanding examples
of this type of legalistic nonsense.20 In the space of
three decisions the members of the Court found it
necessary to write thirteen separate opinions and
in one of the cases, no four justices could agree upon
any one opinion.n
19 Note, 4 Am. CRIm. LAW QUART. 60 (1965).
20 Ginzburg v. United States, - U.S. -, 86 S.Ct.
942 (1966); Mishkin v. New York, - U.S. -, 86 S.Ct.
958 (1966); A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs
of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, - U.S. -, 86 S.Ct.
975 (1966).
21 In Ginzburg, Justice Brennan wrote the majority
opinion and Justices Black, Harlan and Stewart each
State judges also seem to have a tendency to
want to push every Supreme Court decision to its
logical or illogical extreme and to belittle the seri-
ous impact of this on the administration of justice.
No doubt the possibility for this type of enlarge-
ment results from the open-ended nature of the
decisions and perhaps the tendency toward enlarge-
ment results in part from it also.
Consider the aftermath of Gideon v. Wain-
wright," in which the Supreme Court of the United
States held that a defendant had the right to ap-
pointed counsel in the trial of every felony case.
The Fifth Circuit extended this right to misde-
meanor cases.n The current controversy is whether
or not this right should be extended into the area
of traffic violations. In People v. Letterio,2 the
New York Court of Appeals held that an indigent
defendant charged with a "traffic infraction" was
not entitled to the assignment of counsel. Judge
Desmond, the author of one of the papers in this
symposium, was unable to agree with the majority
rule of his colleagues that any other holding would
create an impossible situation. He said:
It is true that in each of the years 1964 and
1965 (the latter estimated) there were in the
Criminal Court of the City of New York
about two million prosecutions on such
charges. Of course we are not suggesting that
counsel be assigned to these vast multitudes.
In New York City in such cases about 98%
of the defendants it appears plead guilty and
there is no question of assignment of counsel
as to them. As to the 2 % who plead not guilty
we are not insisting that counsel be assigned
but only that they be told, if they are indigent,
they may have assigned counsel. Since almost
all of these defendants are either owners of
automobiles or employed as drivers of auto-
mobiles the number who could successfully
plead indigence would be very small indeed.
wrote a dissenting opinion. In addition, Justice Douglas
wrote one dissenting opinion covering both the Ginz-
burg and Mislkin cases. In Mishkin, Justice Brennan
wrote the majority opinion, Justice Harlan concurred
and Justices Black and Stewart each wrote dissenting
opinions. In Menmoirs, Justice Brennan wrote a plural-
ity opinion in which Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Fortas joined, Justices Black and Stewart concurred,
Justice Douglas wrote a concurring opinion and Justices
Clark, Harlan and White each wrote dissenting opin-ions.i 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
n- See Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F. 2d 263 (5th Cir.
1965); McDonald v. Moore, 353 F. 2d 106 (5th Cir.
1965).
- N.Y. 2d -, 213 N.E. 2d 670 (1965).
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Furthermore, the dissenters would require
that the notification as to the availability of
assigned counsel be limited to those cases only
("moving violations") where there is a possi-
bility of substantial punishment. 5
In City of Tacona v. Heater,2 the Supreme Court
of Washington held that the refusal to allow an
arrestee to call his attorney during a four-hour
period of detention after his arrest on a drunk
driving charge required the dismissal of the charge.
The rationale given for the decision was that de-
fendant was denied effective preparation of his
defense because after four hours his drunkenness
at the time of arrest could not be proved or dis-
proved. The underlying assumption was that
calling counsel would have certainly remedied the
situation. This, I believe, is Gideon stretched to the
breaking point. Justice Finley, in his dissent,
pointed out the fallacy in the majority's reasoning:
Appellant's claim is quite shaky in other re-
spects. It requires rather tenuous assumptions,
speculation and conjecture to the effect that:
(1) Attorney Morrison would have been
pleased to accept legal employment from Mr.
Heater via telephone between the hours of
11:30 p.m. and 2:00 or 3:00 a.m.; (2) that
the attorney would not simply have tele-
phoned a professional bondsman, arranged
bail and advised Mr. Heater to take tempor-
ary advantage of the sleeping quarters and
other public accommodations at the Tacoma
City Jail; (3) that Mr. Morrison immediately
would have undertaken a time-consuming
personal work assignment; (4) that he would
have telephoned a doctor; (5) that the doctor
in the best traditions of the Hippocratic oath
would have (a) forsaken sleep and rest, (b)
arisen to such an emergency in the wee hours
of the morning and (c) accompanied Mr.
Morrison to the Tacoma City Jail to take a
blood sample from Mr. Heater's steady and
anxiously awaiting arm; (6) that the sample,
upon being tested, would have shown Mr.
Heater's bloodstream to be Simon pure, or at
least that it contained less than excessive
amounts of firewater; and (7) finally, that the
foregoing chain of events inevitably would
have exonerated Mr. Heater and required a
dismissal of the charges against him.n
25 213 N.E. 2d at 673-74.
26 - Wash. -, 409 P. 2d 867 (1966).
27 409 P. 2d at 876-77. I owe the choice of this and
Perhaps the open-ended nature of Supreme
Court decisions does invite us to develop a con-
structive approach and perhaps we should be
thankful that our present law enforcement tools
and procedure were not all foreclosed by the Mapp,
Escobedo, Massial, and other Supreme Court de-
cisions, but I submit that because of state court
eagerness to extend such decisions, and because of
the inevitability of the coming of "clarification"
by the Court itself, what we are actually given is
at most a short reprieve in combination with an
almost complete lack of guidelines.
Tim DRAFT MODEL CODE OF
PRE-ARRAIGNmENT PROCEDuRE
Tentative Draft No. I of the American Law
Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Pro-
cedure has been submitted to Institute members
and is to be discussed at the annual meeting of the
Institute in May of this year. I want to talk about
one aspect of this proposed code which greatly
concerns me. That is the idea that definite time
limits can be set on police investigative procedures.
Two sections of the draft are very pertinent here.
Section 2.02 (1), Stopping of Persons Having
Knowledge of Crime, reads as follows:
A law enforcement officer lawfully present in
any place may, if he has reasonable cause to
believe that a felony or misdemeanor has been
committed and that any person has knowledge
which may be of material aid to the investiga-
tion thereof, order such person to remain in
or near such place in the officer's presence
for a period of not more than twenty minutes.
(Emphasis added.)
Section 2.02 (2), Stopping of Persons in Suspicious
Circumstances reads:
A law enforcement officer lawfully present
in any place may, if a person is observed in
circumstances which suggest that he has
committed or is about to commit a felony or
misdemeanor, and such action is reasonably
necessary to enable the officer to determine
the lawfulness of that person's conduct, order
that person to remain in or near such place
in the officer's presencefor a period of not indre
than twenty minutes. (Emphasis added.)
Section 4.04 allows detention of a person ar-
rested without a warrant for "preliminary screen-
ing" for a period not to exceed four hours. Excep-
the preceding quotation to the Editors of the Defender
Newsletter (Vol. III, No. 2, March 1966).
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tions are made in cases of certain more serious
crimes by the authorization of further detention
for further screening. The length of detention in
those cases is proscribed by Section 4.05 which
provides that some disposition (charge or release)
must be made:
(a) If the arrested person was first brought
to the police station between 12 midnight
and 8 A.M.-before 4 P.M. of the same day.
(b) If the arrested person was first brought
to the police station between 8 A.M. and 2
P.M.-before 10 P.M. of the same day.
(c) If the arrested person was first brought
to the police station between 2 P.M. and 12
midnight-before 12 Noon of the following
day.
The Drafters' Note on Section 4.05 sheds some
light on this somewhat novel approach. It says in
part:
This section states the purpose and duration
of the period of further detention. ... The
time periods are flexibly defined in view of
the purpose of the section to afford a reason-
able period of day-time custody and investi-
gation, during which witnesses can be found,
laboratory tests made, and other law enforce-
ment agencies checked. It is not the aim of
the Code by this section to afford the police
the opportunity for prolonging the interroga-
tion of the prisoner. Section 5.08 thus provides
that interrogation during this period of deten-
tion may proceed only in the presence or with
the consent of counsel. (Emphasis added.)
While this note explains the drafters' reasons
for wishing to allow varying periods of detention
according to the time of arrest, it does not explain
why the drafters' thought that police investigatory
techniques such as on the street questioning,
locating witnesses, laboratory tests, and com-
munication with other law enforcement agencies
can be conducted with a stop watch.
It has long been my belief that the proponents
of this type of rule favor it out of a lack of under-
standing of the manner in which local police de-
partments must function. I say "must function"
advisedly because after pondering the problem on
many occasions I am forced to the conclusion that
there is no other reasonable way of carrying on
local law enforcement than the traditional method
commonly employed by local police of using in-
custody investigation to solve a large proportion
of their more serious crimes.
I do not contend that the police should violate
the civil rights of an accused in investigating a
crime but only that they must have authority to
conduct an adequate in-custody investigation of
persons whom they have reasonable grounds to
believe have committed crimes.
The law-enforcement process in a municipality
consists of three progressive steps, each being
preceded by a decision as to whether it should be
taken, based upon facts which constitute some
measure of probable cause or proof of the com-
mission of a crime by a suspect. Each step in the
series requires, for its justification, a greater de-
gree of proof than the preceding one. The decision
to take each successive step is based on the quan-
tum of evidence at hand at that time. Each step
may add to the quantum of evidence and thus
justify the succeeding step, and each step should
be taken only when it is justified, and not before.
The steps in chronological sequence are: first,
the street stop and questioning of a suspect; second,
taking the suspect to the police station; and third,
booking the suspect on a definite charge.
The adjudication of the case similarly involves a
progression of steps, each preceded by a decision
requiring a greater quantum of proof than the pre-
ceding one. First, the decision of the prosecutor to
present the suspect for prosecution; second, the
decision at a preliminary hearing to bind over or
to release; third, the decision by the grand jury to
indict or not to indict; and fourth, the decision at
the trial to convict or acquit.
If society is to be protected from criminal at-
tacks, its law-enforcement representatives must be
authorized, in dealing with a person whom the
police have reasonable grounds to believe has com-
mitted or is about to commit a crime, to take cer-
tain steps even though they lack the quantum of
proof required for a conviction or even to make a
formal charge. Let us consider the need for each
of these steps in the protection of our citizens from
criminal attack.
The first step-the street stop and questioning:
When a policeman encounters someone on the
street under circumstances that would lead a rea-
sonably prudent policeman to suspect that some-
thing is amiss, he must and should stop the suspect
long enough to ask a few pertinent questions. Per-
haps the explanation of the person suspected may
resolve all grounds for suspicion right then and
there, thus terminating the incident. Twenty
minutes may or may not be sufficient time to ac-
complish this step.
The second step-taking the suspect to the
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police station:
The incident described above may not, on the
other hand, terminate with the immediate release
of the suspect. What he says or refuses to say,
what the officer observes and what he learns from
possible witnesses at the scene, may add to the
reasonable grounds for belief sufficient to justify
arrest and may provide evidence of the need for
wider and more inteniive investigation. While the
quantum of proof may justify arrest, the officer
may still lack the degree of proof needed for prose-
cution. Again he may or may not be able to supply
the needed proof within a 4, 8, 12, or even 22 hour
period, for that matter.
The third step-booking the suspect on a definite
charge:
Bringing the suspect to a police station affords
the police an opportunity to discharge six impor-
tant, but many times time-consuming, obligations
which they owe to the law-abiding citizens of their
community. In doing so, the police may discover
facts which will provide the quantum of proof
needed for the third step-booking the prisoner.
This does not, however, relieve them of their six
investigative obligations. They must continue their
investigation in order to build up the quantum of
proof needed to convict the criminal in court.
The first obligation-checking the suspect's
story:
The police would be naive indeed, and subject to
justifiable public censure, should they release a
suspect who had just committed a heinous crime
simply because of some unsubstantial explanation
given by the person suspected of the crime. The
police have an obligation to corroborate the story
given by the suspect, and they should have a
reasonable period of time to do so.
The second obligation--checking the identity of
the suspect:
When the police have some reason for believing
that the suspect may be wanted locally or in some
other jurisdiction for the commission of a crime,
they should have a reasonable period of time to
check their fingerprint and other files to ascertain
whether the suspect is a "wanted" person. They
would be justifiably subject to censure should they
release from their custody one of the r.B.i.'s most
wanted criminals. I suggest that an identification
check alone can seldom be accomplished in less
than four hours.
The third obligation-getting statements from
victims and witnesses:
The victim of a criminal assault may be uncon-
scious in a hospital. All witnesses to the assault
may not yet be known to the police. The police
have an obligation to search out witnesses and to
obtain statements from them and the victim; they
should have a reasonable time to do so before re-
leasing the suspect when there is a strong reason
to believe him guilty of the assault even though
they lack, at that moment, the quantum of proof
required for his prosecution.
The fourth obligation-making laboratory anal-
ysis of physical evidence:
The suspect may have in his possession a sub-
stance which may be a contraband drug or a fire-
arm which may be a murder weapon, or a punch
or other tool which may have been used in a safe
burglary or other crime. The police would look
pretty silly to the public they are charged with
protecting should they release a suspect, and then
in a few hours learn from their crime laboratory
that the firearm he had in his possession was used
in a sex-murder of a schoolgirl. The police have an
obligation to make these laboratory tests and they
should have a reasonable time to do so.
The fifth obligation-to search for the murder
weapon and loot:
The investigation sometimes uncovers leads as
to the location of a hidden murder weapon or loot
that has been concealed or disposed of. Their re-
covery may provide the quantum of proof needed
to justify prosecution. The police have an obliga-
tion to effect their recovery and should have a
resonable time to do so.
The sixth obligation-a lineup for victims and
witnesses:
The police often arrest a person on probable
cause and yet are not in a position to place a for-
mal charge because the suspect has not yet been
identified by the victim or witnesses. A reasonable
delay is necessary in order to arrange for the vic-
tims and witnesses to view and identify the sus-
pect. Moreover, a criminal often commits a series
of similar crimes in such a manner and in such a
chronological and geographical pattern as to justify
the police in believing that all of the crimes were
committed by the same man. When a suspect is in
custody, the police have an obligation to bring in
all victims and witnesses to observe him in a lineup.
They should have reasonable time to do so.
I maintain that these are necessary police pro-
cedures. I know of no other reasonable alternative
procedures. What other courses can the police
pursue? Why can't they have a "reasonable time"
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in which to do them? Why must we put them on a
schedule?
The police could release the suspect with the
understanding that he make himself available for
viewing by the victim at a time mutually con-
venient to all parties. This might be practicable if
the suspect were a person well known in the com-
munity, a family man, or property owner who
would be unlikely to flee. But robbers, burglars,
and sex offenders are usually a different type of
person. If you let them go today you would be
unlikely to find them tomorrow.
The step-by-step process that I have described
is recognized by Judge Burger, of the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in
his opinion in the case of United States v. Gold-
smith.:2
At the risk of stating the obvious, we take
note that the process of law enforcement
must, of necessity, proceed step by step ....
A vital factor to bear in mind is that as these
steps progress the burden of the law enforce-
ment agency increases. What may constitute
probable cause for arrest does not necessarily
constitute probable cause for a charge or ar-
raignment .... Hence at each stage, and
especially at the early stage, when little is
known that is sure, police must not be compelled
prematurely to make the hard choices, such as
arraigning or releasing, on incomplete infor-
mation. If they are forced to make a decision
to seek a charge on incomplete information,
they may irreparably injure an innocent per-
son; if they must decide prematurely to re-
lease, they may be releasing a guilty one.
(Emphasis added.)
The police must have sufficient time to conduct
an in-custody investigation in most arrest situa-
tions. I think it is a mistake to set arbitrary limits
upon what a resonable time is, in any given case.
Apprised of the facts, certainly a judge could
- 277 F. 2d 335, 344-345 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
make a decision. While I ask for guidelines, purely
arbitrary ones are of course far worse than none at
all.
Likewise, I think it is a mistake to set a 20 min-
ute limitation upon on-the-street interrogations.
A police officer should be discouraged from ques-
tioning a man for 20 minutes when he has com-
pletely exonerated himself in two minutes as well
as from releasing a man after 20 minutes when it
would take 30 minutes to complete the question-
ing.
CONCLUSION
I cannot agree with Commissioner Broderick
that the rule relating to exclusion of evidence
announced in the Mapp case and the rule of the
Escobedo case relating to the exclusion of confes-
sions are correct or even make good sense.
Although the rules announced in those two cases,
or even others like them, will not destroy law
enforcement, they will undoubtedly make the task
of law enforcement infinitely more difficult and
for no sufficient reason.
As I have said many times before, I am opposed,
in principle, to court rules that free the guilty in
an effort to teach the police a lesson. I feel that
the purpose of criminal justice should be to ascer-
tain the truth, so that the innocent may be freed
and the guilty punished. In applying the exclu-
sionary rule, it is society that is being punished,
not the police. The only beneficiary of this type
of rule is the criminal. And it is a rule that is a
real factor in the steady increase in crime.
The correct approach, it seems to me, is to raise
the standards of our law enforcement personnel,
to attract better personnel by decent salaries, to
improve our training, and to hold individual law
enforcement officers responsible, through criminal
and disciplinary procedures, and civil liability for
any violations of the civil rights of an accused, re-
gardless of whether the accused is guilty or
innocent.
[Vol. 59
